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Abstract 
 
 
While positive, long-run abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements are substantially 
lower when CEOs are overconfident. This effect is particularly strong for (i) difficult to value firms, 
such as small, young, non-dividend paying, distressed, and having negative earnings firms, (ii) firms 
with poor past stock return performance and high book-to-market ratio, indicators of possible 
overreaction to bad news, and (iii) financially constrained firms. Overall, these results are consistent 
with the mispricing hypothesis as a motive for repurchases and as an explanation for the buyback 
anomaly. Additionally, irrespective of the CEO’s level of confidence, abnormal returns are considerably 
larger for financially constrained firms, implying their managers require larger undervaluation due to 
the higher cost of capital. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The buyback anomaly is one of the most persistent and difficult to explain stock market 
anomalies. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, 2000) find positive long-run 
abnormal returns for a period of up to 48 months following share repurchase announcements. 
Several explanations have been proposed for the buyback anomaly. Vermaelen (1981, 1984), 
Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argue that mispricing drives 
the anomaly. Specifically, these authors suggest that the buyback anomaly is a consequence of 
a correction to overreaction to bad news. By announcing a stock repurchase, managers either 
try to signal to the market the undervaluation or try to time the market. Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) argue that changes in the cost of capital following repurchase announcements drive the 
post-buyback high abnormal returns. Another explanation is the liquidity hypothesis: when 
firms repurchase stock, they reduce their liquidity. If a liquidity level or liquidity risk are priced 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
then the abnormal returns could be due to the liquidity level or the omission of a liquidity factor 
in the empirical tests.  
 
Our paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we test the mispricing hypothesis. If 
undervaluation is the motive behind share repurchases, then the long run abnormal returns will 
be different when the managerial signals to the market are likely to be true than when the signals 
are likely to be biased due to managerial overconfidence. That is, we hypothesize that the post-
repurchase announcement long-run abnormal returns of overconfident CEOs are on average 
lower. Our empirical findings confirm this hypothesis. This finding extends the literature that 
examines the relation among share repurchase intensity, short run abnormal returns post 
buyback announcements, and managerial overconfidence. 
 
Second, we test whether the difficulty to value stocks affects the role of managerial 
overconfidence in the post buyback anomaly. Baker and Wurgler (2006) show that difficulty of 
valuation is key to the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices. That is, the valuations and 
returns of difficult to value stocks are substantially more affected by investors’ positive and 
negative sentiments. Given this, we ask whether difficult to value stocks are also the most 
affected by managers’ misvaluation stemming from overconfidence. We find that managerial 
overconfidence matters for the buyback anomaly only when firms are difficult to value. 
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Why do we expect the post share repurchase announcements long-run abnormal returns 
to be lower when managers are overconfident? First, extant literature suggests that 
overconfident CEOs perceive the stock of their company to be undervalued by the market 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005a). Hence, overconfident managers are more likely than 
underconfident managers to believe that the stocks are underpriced, even when the stock is 
actually not underpriced. Repurchasing a non-underpriced stock would lead to lower long-run 
abnormal returns relative to the case when the stock is indeed underpriced.  
 
Second, even if the stocks are indeed underpriced it might still not be optimal for the 
firm to repurchase them for the following reason. If share repurchase occurs when the shares 
are undervalued, then staying shareholders benefit from wealth transfer at the expense of 
outgoing shareholders. However, by repurchasing stocks, a firm may also suffer costs; for 
instance, reduced financial slack and liquidity, and loss of shareholder base.3 Overall, the 
magnitude of undervaluation dictates a trade-off between benefits and costs of stock repurchase 
and determines long-run abnormal returns. That is, the undervaluation has to be above a certain 
threshold for the repurchase to be profitable. Overconfident managers overestimate the degree 
of mispricing and hence are likely to sometime undertake repurchases when the costs outweigh 
the benefits, leading to lower average long-run abnormal returns for these managers. Thus, for 
a given level of undervaluation, we expect lower abnormal returns when the CEO is 
overconfident. 
 
We divide the announcing firms according to the degree of confidence of their CEOs 
and test whether long-run abnormal returns are different when CEOs are overconfident. We 
employ three prominent measures of CEO overconfidence. Our primary measure is a press-
based measure of CEO overconfidence following Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008), 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) and Hribar and Yang (2015). The press-based measure 
employs count of words relating to managerial overconfidence (or its opposite) in proximity to 
the company name and the keyword “CEO”. As robustness checks, we employ two additional 
measures. First, we use the longholder measure based on late option exercise behavior (see, 
e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). The options exercise 
measure builds on the idea that a CEO who chooses to be exposed to the firm’s idiosyncratic 
risk by delaying option exercise is likely to be overconfident about the firm’s prospects. Second, 
                                                 
3 This implies that the minimum level of underpricing that triggers a repurchase is not zero. 
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we divide the sample by the gender of the executive team, and the gender of the CEOs and 
CFOs. This measure builds on the fact that men have been found to show a heighten 
overconfident behavior than women (Barber and Odean, 2001; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Dahlbom, Jakobsson, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam, 2011; and Huang and Kisgen, 2013). 
 
Using a sample of share repurchases that covers the period 1992 through 2009, we find 
that firms with overconfident CEOs earn substantially lower post-announcement long-run 
abnormal returns than firms with underconfident CEOs. Specifically, firms with underconfident 
CEOs earn a 48-month cumulative abnormal return of 27.80 percent, whereas firms with 
overconfident CEOs earn only 17.39 percent return.4 Consistent with the mispricing hypothesis 
for share repurchases, this finding suggests that at the buyback announcement time, the shares 
of firms with overconfident managers are, on average, less undervalued than the shares of 
underconfident managers. Thus, it appears that there are more overconfident CEOs who 
announce stock repurchases when the undervaluation, if any at all, is not enough to compensate 
the costs of the repurchase, and therefore the overall effect is lower than for announcing firms 
with underconfident CEOs. In other words, while in both groups of firms there will likely be 
CEOs that misjudge the undervaluation of their firms, the fraction of misjudging CEOs will be 
larger for the group of firms with overconfident CEOs, and the overall cumulative abnormal 
returns will be lower for this group of firms.  
 
Interestingly, while the abnormal returns post repurchase announcements are lower 
when CEOs are overconfident, they are still significantly positive. Hence, although 
overconfident managers tend to exaggerate the degree of mispricing, there is still a significant 
number of overconfident CEOs that correctly appraise the undervaluation of their stocks, or 
that although they exaggerate the undervaluation, it actually exists and is sufficiently high to 
render the repurchase profitable in spite of potential costs. Thus, on average, overconfident 
managers are still valuing the company better than the market. At least two reasons could 
potentially account for this. First, managers (including overconfident managers) likely have 
                                                 
4 The difference in abnormal returns between stocks of firms with overconfident CEOs and stocks of firms with 
underconfident CEOs becomes economically significant only after two years. This finding is similar to Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009), who find that poor past performers begin to outperform other announcing firms only after 
approximately two years. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) attribute the late outperformance to mistakes made by 
analysts. Specifically, according to the analyst mistake hypothesis, the repurchase announcement is a response of 
the company to a mistake made by financial analysts. As analysts are unlikely to admit they made a mistake, a 
repurchase announcement receives no support from analysts. If analysts do not change their published opinions 
after the repurchase, stocks may remain undervalued for an extended period of time. 
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more information about the company than the market, enabling them to spot underpricing of 
their own firms’ stocks. Second, the market, realizing that the CEO is overconfident and is 
prone to undertaking negative NPV real investment projects, could view repurchases by 
overconfident CEOs positively, or at least less negatively, as free cash flow is reduced and the 
agency cost induced by free cash flows alleviated (Jensen, 1986). Indeed, overconfident CEOs 
tend to overestimate project value and underestimate project risk. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) 
find that overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view 
external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds. 
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) indicate that many executives have miscalibrated 
risk/return distributions. These traits of overconfident CEOs likely cause them to undertake 
negative NPV physical investment projects at times.  
 
In order to test the effect of the difficulty to value on the role of managerial 
overconfidence in the buyback anomaly, we divide the announcing firms according to how 
difficult they are to value. Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that small, young, non-dividend 
paying, distressed, and unprofitable firms are more difficult to value. Thus, we divide 
repurchase events into different categories based on these firm characteristics. As expected, the 
results show that for young, and non-dividend paying firms, the long-run underperformance of 
stocks of firms with overconfident CEOs relative to stocks of firms with underconfident CEOs, 
is economically larger and statistically significant. 5  Interestingly, when valuation is not 
difficult, there is no statistically significant difference in the long-run abnormal returns of 
repurchases announced by overconfident and underconfident CEOs.  
 
Further, we also investigate the interaction between the CEO overconfidence effect and 
the relationship between share repurchases and a firm’s financial constraint status. This 
interaction is particularly interesting because, generally, due to financing costs, managers of 
financially constrained firms might be more reluctant to repurchase; this implies that a larger 
undervaluation is required to proceed and repurchase. While this is true for underconfident 
CEOs, for overconfident CEOs the decision to repurchase is complicated by the fact that 
overconfidence has implications for both financing costs (which deters repurchases) and 
undervaluation (which advances repurchases) (Malmendier and Tate (2005b)). We divide firms 
using four different common measures of financial constraints, the Whited and Wu (2006) 
                                                 
5 We find similar results for firms with negative earnings. However they are not statistically significant, possibly 
due to a small number of observations. 
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index, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size and age measure, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index and firm size. The results show that stocks of firms that are financially constrained and 
have overconfident CEOs underperform relative to stocks of firms managed by underconfident 
CEOs. This finding suggests that decisions of overconfident CEOs to repurchase are affected 
more by their perception about their firms’ undervaluation rather than financing costs. 
 
We also find that when firms are financially constrained, stocks of firms with both 
overconfident and underconfident CEOs earn substantially higher average abnormal returns 
than when firms are financially unconstrained. A potential explanation for this finding is that 
the cost of repurchase is higher when firms are financially constrained. Consequently, 
financially constrained firms announce buybacks when their stocks, on average, are more 
undervalued. This result differs from Chen and Wang (2012), who find that the characteristics-
adjusted long-run abnormal returns are poorer for financially constrained firms, but is consistent 
with Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) who find that small firms earn substantially higher abnormal 
returns following announcements. We note that firms’ market capitalization is a well-known 
indicator of the degree firms are financially constrained (see, for example, Hadlock, and Pierce, 
2010).  
 
Finally, we also investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence and the fraction 
of shares bought back at the announcement time. The results show that this fraction is 
substantially higher when CEOs are overconfident. This finding is consistent with the 
conjecture that overconfident CEOs perceive their company stocks as undervalued by the 
market.  
 
Several reasons for repurchasing stock are given in the literature. One explanation is 
that share buyback is a way of distributing free cash flow in case of lack of good investment 
opportunities, and therefore a tool to diminish the agency costs of free cash flows, as argued by 
Jensen (1986).  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find a positive correlation between repurchases 
and the level of cash flows, consistent with this explanation. Another possible reason for a stock 
repurchase can be a restructuring of the capital structure of the firm. This is especially so in the 
case of the repurchase being largely funded through debt. Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and Opler 
and Titman (1994) discuss and show the impact that repurchasing stock has on leverage. The 
results of these papers indicate that firms may repurchase stocks to increase their leverage ratio. 
Bagwell (1991) explains how firms use repurchases to fend off unwanted takeover attempts and 
7 
 
Jolls (1996) and Fenn and Liang (1997) illustrate that firms use repurchases to counter the 
dilution effects of employee and management stock options. A third possible reason for share 
buybacks is that a stock repurchase is a tool to transfer wealth from debtholders to stockholders 
since the amount of wealth remaining in the firm is reduced and therefore, debtholders are more 
damaged in case of liquidation (Dhillon and Johnson, 1994; Maxwell and Stephens, 2003). 
Finally, a reason for repurchasing stock might be to exploit information asymmetries between 
insiders and outsiders. Vermaelen (1981, 1984) studies repurchases and argues that 
management uses its inside informational advantage to buy back the shares of their own firms 
when they consider these to be undervalued. This signals the mispricing to the market and, after 
the repurchase announcement, the market takes corrective action pushing the stock price 
upwards. Dittmar (2000) finds that the dominant motivation for share repurchases is to take 
advantage of potential undervaluation. Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) conduct a 
survey among a large number of financial executives. The executives surveyed say that they 
accelerate (or initiate) share repurchases when the company's stock price is low by recent 
historical standards. The most popular response for all repurchase questions on the survey is 
that firms repurchase when their stock is a good value, relative to its true value. This is 
consistent with the explanation given by Vermaelen (1981, 1984). Our paper relates to 
Vermaelen’s signaling hypothesis since we use the informational content of the signal sent by 
the management when announcing stock repurchases. Overconfident managers send a less 
credible signal and the market does not react in the same way as it reacts after a more credible 
signal sent by underconfident managers.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on our contribution 
to the literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 details our empirical methodology. The 
results are presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Contribution to the literature 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, it expands our understanding of 
the buyback anomaly. While a number of potential explanations for the anomaly have been 
suggested in the literature, namely the change in cost of capital explanation (Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004), the liquidity hypothesis based on the pricing of liquidity (Peyer and 
Vermaelen , 2009), and the mispricing hypothesis (Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2004; Peyer and 
Vermaelen, 2009), our finding that the cumulative abnormal returns of announcing firms under 
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overconfident managers underperform is consistent with the latter hypothesis. Overconfident 
CEOs tend to perceive their company shares as being undervalued and thus may engage in 
repurchase activities even when their stocks are not undervalued or when the extent of the 
undervaluation is not large enough to compensate the by costs of the stock repurchase. The 
market interprets the signal as driven by mere overconfidence and, on average, abnormal returns 
after announcements by overconfident CEOs are lower than for underconfident CEOs. 
Underconfident CEOs, however, only announce a repurchase based on more objective 
assessments of the stock misvaluation. The market, thus, reacts accordingly to the signal and 
the average abnormal returns are higher. These results empirically support Chan, Ikenberry, 
and Lee (2004) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) explanation of mispricing driving the 
anomaly.  
 
It is important to note that we do not argue that overconfident CEOs only announce 
repurchases when their stocks are not undervalued. In fact, the positive abnormal returns 
following repurchase announcements of overconfident CEOs is an indication that, on average, 
overconfident CEOs announce repurchases when their stocks are truly underpriced. Thus, our 
claim is that the likelihood of a repurchase announcement when the stock is not underpriced is 
higher when the CEO is overconfident than when the CEO is underconfident. The relative 
underperformance of stocks of firms with overconfident managers following repurchase 
announcements provides empirical support for our claim.  
 
Second, we extend the burgeoning literature that investigates the influences of 
managerial overconfidence on firms’ policies. In this vein, Malmendier and Tate (2005b) show 
that firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit high investment-cash-flow sensitivity. 
Overconfident CEOs have also been found to engage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and 
acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), and avoid tapping the capital markets (Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan, 2011). In addition, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) find that firms with 
overconfident CFOs invest more, tolerate higher financial leverage, pay out fewer dividends, 
use more long-term debt than short-term debt and engage in market timing activity. We expand 
this literature by showing that CEO overconfidence affects firms’ stock performance especially 
when valuation is difficult and subjective. Particularly, our findings indicate that the effect of 
managerial overconfidence on the post-buyback abnormal returns is substantially higher for 
small firms, non-dividend paying firms, and young firms. Overconfident CEOs in such firms 
know that outsiders have more difficulty to appraise the true value of these firms, and tend to 
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disregard the information given by the market price. These managers tend to use their personal 
and biased appraisals of their own firms and are more likely to infer that the market price is too 
low. Underconfident CEOs, on the other hand, use every piece of information available in order 
to assess the value of their firms’ stocks and only announce stock repurchases when they are 
almost certain that their stocks are truly underpriced. Consistent with this conjecture, we find a 
large difference between the cumulative abnormal returns after stock repurchases announced 
by firms under overconfident and underconfident CEOs when firms are difficult to value. If 
firms are easier to value, overconfident CEOs are likely to consider the market price as more 
informative and this reduces the likelihood of overvaluation. Therefore, the difference between 
the abnormal returns after stock repurchase announcements by overconfident and 
underconfident CEOs is largely diminished for firms that are easier to value. For example, 
analyst coverage of small firms is substantially lower than that of large firms, making valuation 
mistakes by investors more likely. While the post-buyback abnormal returns of small stocks 
with overconfident CEOs is positive (implying that investors sometimes underprice these 
stocks), it is substantially lower than the post-buyback abnormal returns of small firms with 
underconfident CEOs, implying that overconfident managers often overvalue their stocks. This 
conclusion is further supported by our finding that the effect of overconfidence is stronger for 
firms with poor past performance and high book-to-market firms. These firms are more likely 
to be considered as undervalued by their CEOs when CEOs are overconfident even in the case 
that the market is correct, whereas underconfident CEOs tend to be more objective about the 
undervaluation, and announce repurchases when they are more certain that their firms’ stocks 
are indeed undervalued and that the undervaluation is of enough magnitude to compensate the 
costs of the repurchases. 
 
More specifically, our paper contributes to the literature that examines the relation 
between managerial overconfidence and share repurchases. Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos, 
and Hoque (2013) analyze data from UK regulatory and disclosure environment and document 
that overconfident CEOs perceive their shares as undervalued and have a higher buyback 
completion rate. Similarly, Shu, Yeh, Chiang, and Hung (2013), using data from Taiwan, 
document that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of share 
repurchasing. Further, these authors conduct a short-run event study and conclude that for 
repurchase programs launched by overconfident managers, company shares were not 
undervalued and, therefore, were associated with reduced 3-month post-announcement returns. 
Our main contribution relative to these papers is to show that managerial overconfidence 
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matters for share repurchases only when firms are difficult to value. This result is important 
because it highlights the interaction between managers’ traits and the uncertainty faced by 
investors in valuation. Moreover, we study long-term stock performance, in accordance with 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), whereas Shu, 
Yeh, Chiang, and Hung (2013) study the market’s reaction up to three months following the 
announcement. In a contemporaneous paper to ours Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda 
(2018) show that overconfident CEOs are more prone to repurchase shares and the stock 
market’s reaction to their share repurchase announcement is less positive. These authors, 
however, do not explore how the difficulty to value firms affects the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and share repurchase long-run abnormal returns. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) show that the difficulty of firm valuation is key to the impact of investor sentiment on 
stock prices. As such, our study offers complementary evidence because it suggests that the 
difficulty to value firms exacerbates the effects of managerial overconfidence on a major 
corporate policy, namely share repurchases. We also explore the effect of financial constraints 
on the abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements, and the interaction 
between financial constraints and managerial overconfidence, whereas none of the papers 
mentioned above explores these. The findings indicate that managers are more prudent in share 
repurchase decisions when their firms are financially constrained.  
 
3. Data and variables 
 
We use several data sources in our study. We obtain the sample of common stock repurchases 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) US mergers and acquisitions and repurchase 
database. Our sample period covers the period 1992 through 2009 and includes 16,025 
repurchase announcements. For stock returns, we use the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. We require a firm to have at least 36 months of stock return data prior to the 
announcement to be included in the sample. Accounting information is from Compustat while 
executive compensation and gender-related data are from ExecuComp. The data for the Fama 
and French three factors and momentum are obtained from Kenneth French's website. 
 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for firms that announced stock repurchases. We 
exclude those events where there was an earlier repurchase announcement by the same 
company within 1 month.  Table 1 then divides the sample into repurchases announced by 
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overconfident CEOs and repurchases announced by underconfident CEOs following the 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) confidence indicator. 
 
3.1 Managerial overconfidence measures 
We use three measures for managerial overconfidence. First, we employ a press-based measure 
following prior studies (i.e., Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008); Hribar and Yang (2015); and 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)). To operationalize this measure, we search Factiva for 
articles referring to the CEO in The New York Times, BusinessWeek, Financial Times, The 
Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Fortune, and Forbes. We identify all articles using the 
available unique company code in Factiva and the search keyword “CEO”. For each CEO and 
year, we record (1) the total number of articles, (2) the number of articles containing the words 
“confident”, “confidence”, or variants such as overconfidence and overconfident, (3) the 
number of articles containing the words “optimistic”,  “optimism”, or variants such as 
overoptimistic and over-optimism, (4) the number of articles using “pessimistic”, “pessimism”, 
or variants such as over pessimistic, and (5) the number of articles using “reliable”, “steady”, 
“practical”,  “conservative”, “frugal”, “cautious”, or “gloomy”. Category 5 also contains 
articles in which “confident” and “optimistic” are negated. The sample is divided into two 
groups: firms with overconfident CEOs and firms with underconfident CEOs. For every year, 
a CEO is classified as overconfident if the number of articles using the confident terms is larger 
than the number of articles using the pessimistic terms. A CEO is classified as underconfident 
if the number of articles including pessimistic terms surpasses the number of articles including 
the optimistic terms. Note that from all the firms that announce a repurchase, we only have 
information about the degree of confidence of those CEOs that are referred to in articles 
available in Factiva. Therefore, we can only divide the sample between overconfident CEOs 
and underconfident CEOs. We cannot say anything about non-overconfident CEOs since this 
group would include all CEOs for which there is not a match in Factiva and therefore, it would 
contain both overconfident CEOs and underconfident CEOs that were simply not named.  
 
Second, we use an options-based measure for managerial overconfidence. Specifically, 
we use a longholder measure based on the CEOs’ option exercise behavior (see, e.g., 
Malmendier, and Tate, 2008; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Longholder builds on the idea 
that preferences of risk-averse CEOs’ not to exercise stock options timely, even though the 
underlying stock price exceeds rational exercise thresholds (Hall and Murphy, 2002), is likely 
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to reveal personal beliefs about their firms’ future performance. Thus, a CEO is classified as 
overconfident when she holds an option until the year of expiration, even though the stock 
option is at least 40% in-the-money entering its final year. Specifically, we exploit information 
about all outstanding options held by a CEO that are directly observable starting in 2006 due to 
requirements from the FAS 123R and we identify CEOs who, at least once during the period 
2006-2013, hold an option until the year of expiration, even though the stock option is at least 
40% in-the-money entering its final year. Since a typical option has 10 years’ duration and is 
fully vested by the fifth year, the longholder measure likely captures habitual, rather than time-
varying, failure of CEOs to diversify across several years, starting from 1996. Accordingly, we 
back filled the classifications of each CEO during her entire tenure for the period 1992-2009. 
Finally, CEOs that never exercise options do not reveal beliefs and, thus, we exclude them from 
the sample. 
 
Third, we use a gender-based measure for managerial overconfidence. Barber and 
Odean (2001) analyze the common stock investments of more than 35,000 households and 
report that men trade 45% more than women. They argue that this excess trading is due to 
overconfidence. Differences in confidence between genders are also reported by Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007). Specifically, these authors find that male overconfidence can be a key factor 
in explaining the higher degree of willingness to compete shown by men. This can reflect in 
differences in selection of compensation schemes and in the underrepresentation of women in 
top-level firm positions. Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that male executives undertake more 
acquisitions and issue more debt than female executives. They also find that investors react 
more favorably to significant corporate decisions made by firms with female executives. 
Empirically. we divide our sample in several ways according to the Execucomp’s gender 
classification of executives. First, we divide the announcing firms into two groups according to 
whether all the executives were males or there were females on the executive team. Second, we 
divide the announcing firms according to whether any of the CEO or CFO are males versus at 
least one of them is a female.6 Finally, we divide the announcing firms according to whether 
the CFO is a male or a female. 
 
3.2 Financial constraint and book-to-market measures 
                                                 
6 Similar to Jian, Petroni, and Wang (2010), we identify CEOs and CFOs using ExecuComp’s classification (data 
item CEOANN=CEO and TITLEANN contains any of the following words: CFO, chief financial officer, 
treasurer, controller, finance, and vice president-finance, respectively). 
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We use four different measures of financial constraints commonly employed in recent literature, 
namely the Whited and Wu (2006) WW index, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size and age SA 
measure, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) KZ index, and firm size where size is measured as the 
market value of common equity. Firms with higher WW index, higher SA index, higher KZ 
index, and smaller firms are more financially constrained.  
 
We calculate the book-to-market ratio as the book value of assets divided by the market 
value of assets, where the market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets minus 
the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for non-announcing firms, defining these as those 
companies that did not announce any stock repurchase during the specific year. Announcing 
firms tend to be more constrained than non-announcing firms by every one of our constraint 
measures. This does not support the explanation of firms repurchasing stock to distribute free 
cash flow to reduce their agency costs. Moreover, announcing firms tend to have higher book-
to-market ratios, indicating that these firms are likely to be undervalued and that the 
management uses the repurchase announcement as a means of signaling the misvaluation to the 
market. 
 
4. Methodology  
 
To investigate whether firms have long-run abnormal returns after the announcement of open 
market repurchases, we follow Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) and use the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model with momentum as an additional factor (known as the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model) combined with Ibbotson's RATS methodology to calculate the abnormal returns. 
In this methodology, security excess returns are regressed on the four factors for each month in 
event time, and the estimated intercept represents the monthly average abnormal return for each 
event month. We consider long-run abnormal returns between 1 month and 48 months after the 
announcement of the open market repurchase program.  
 
The sample is then divided into two groups, one having overconfident CEOs, and the 
other with underconfident CEOs. The following cross-sectional regression is run each event 
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month j (j=0 is the event month in which the open market repurchase is announced, j=1 to j=48 
are the 1st month to the 48th month after the announcement) for each group: 
 
titjtjtjtftmjjtfti MOMeHMLdSMBcRRbaRR ,,,,, )( ++++−+=−                (1)  
where Ri,t  is the monthly return on security i in the calendar month t corresponding to event 
month j. Rf,t, Rm,t,  SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt  are the risk-free rate, the return on the equally 
weighted CRSP index, and the monthly returns on the size, book-to-market and momentum 
factors in the calendar month t corresponding to event month j, respectively. The coefficient aj  
is the result of a monthly cross-sectional regression. We get 12, 24, 36 and 48 monthly estimates 
of these aj -depending on the length of the horizon we are exploring. Then, 12-, 24-, 36- and 
48-month cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated as the sum of the aj over the 
relevant period of time. The standard error for a given event window is the square root of the 
sum of squares of the monthly standard errors. 
 
Based on our argumentation, the effect of overconfidence on the long-run abnormal 
returns following buyback announcements is expected to vary with the difficulty associated 
with firm valuation, therefore we divide the firms into groups on the basis of firm characteristics 
that proxy for this difficult-to-value attribute.  Then, within each difficult-to-value group, we 
further classify firms according to the level of managerial overconfidence at the time of the 
repurchase announcement. 
 
In more detail, we divide firms according to age, and their dividend payment status.7  
Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that young firms are more difficult to value.8 A firm is 
classified as young if it appears at CRSP for less than 72 months before the announcement and 
as an old firm if it appears for more than 241 months before the announcement. Baker and 
Wurgler also posit that non-dividend-paying firms and unprofitable firms are more difficult to 
value being more exposed to fluctuations in investors' sentiment. We, therefore, divide our 
sample according to these two criteria. A firm is classified as a payer if it pays dividends in the 
year previous to the repurchase announcement, and as a non-payer if it does not pay dividends. 
A firm is classified as profitable if it has positive earnings in the year previous to the 
                                                 
7 We also divide firms according to whether they have positive earnings, or zero or negative earnings. We do not 
report the results because there are too few observations among firms with zero or negative earnings.  
8 Young firms are followed by fewer specialists, and therefore they are more unknown to the different agents in 
the economy. This implies that they are more difficult to value for investors. 
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announcement, and as non-profitable if it reports zero or negative earnings, where earnings are 
defined as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization. 
 
Following Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), we identify announcing firms that are likely to 
be undervalued by the market. 9  We separate the firms according to their 6-month stock 
performance before the repurchase announcement. A firm is classified as a good performer if 
its cumulative return for the 6 months before the announcement is above the 75 percentile of 
the cumulative returns of all firms that announce a stock repurchase. A firm is classified as a 
poor performer if its cumulative return is below the 25 percentile. We also divide the 
announcing firms according to their book-to-market ratios as in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995). These authors argue that value stocks (i.e., high book-to-market ratio) are 
more likely to be undervalued. A firm is classified as high book-to-market if, in the year 
previous to the announcement, its book-to-market is above the 75 percentile of all the firms that 
announce a repurchase. A firm is classified as low book-to-market if it is below the 25 
percentile. 
 
Further, we divide the sample by using four measures of financial constraints, the WW 
index, firm size, the SA index, and the KZ index. We classify a firm as being financially 
constrained if it belongs to the top 25 percentile of the WW index, to the lowest 25 percentile 
according to size, to the top 25 percentile of the SA index, or top 25 percentile in the KZ index 
in the year before the announcement. A firm is classified as financially unconstrained if it 
belongs to any other percentile with the exception of when using size as a constraint measure, 
in which case a firm is classified as unconstrained if it belongs to the top 25 percentile. 
 
We finally test whether overconfident CEOs also announce a larger fraction of shares 
to be repurchased, by running the following cross-sectional regression: 
 
iii
iiiii
BEDIVityProfitabil
PriorRetBMEqSizeConfidenceFraction


+++
+++++=
)/(65
43210
       (2) 
 
                                                 
9 Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that stocks experience larger positive long-run excess returns if the repurchase 
follows a severe stock-price decline in the previous 6 months to the announcement. This finding strongly supports 
the mispricing hypothesis. They argue that the long-run excess returns are a correction of an overreaction to bad 
news prior to the announcement. If this is the case, then distinguishing between good and bad previous performers 
is an ideal setting for our confidence indicator. 
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where Fractioni is the fraction of the issued stock announced to be repurchased in event i, 
Confidencei is our overconfidence indicator calculated as in Hirshleifer, Low, and Theo (2012) 
for the CEO of the firm related to event i, EqSizei is the market value of common equity of the 
announcing firm in the year previous to the announcement, BMi is the ratio of the book value 
of equity to the market value of equity in the year previous to the announcement, PriorReti  is 
the 6-month cumulative stock return for the six months preceding the announcement of event 
i, Profitabilityi is the ratio of income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization to shareholders equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes in the previous year to the 
announcement of i, and DIV/BEi is the ratio of total dividends to book equity defined as the 
shareholders equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes in the year preceding the announcement. 
We estimate this equation using OLS with clustered at the firm level standard errors. We expect 
to find a significant and positive coefficient for the variable Confidence, implying that 
overconfident CEOs announce larger repurchase fractions, consistent with our argument of 
overconfident CEOs viewing their stocks as underpriced by the market. 
 
5. Results 
 
We start the presentation of our results by showing the overall effect of overconfidence in the 
cumulative abnormal returns following repurchase announcements. Table 3 reports the 
abnormal returns for all the firms on the SDC database that announce a repurchase and then for 
those that we classify as having overconfident CEOs and underconfident CEOs using our press-
based overconfidence indicator. We can see that the repurchase anomaly is still persistent up to 
2009. The average abnormal return after 48 months following an announcement is 25.12 
percent statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We also observe that underconfident CEOs 
earn higher returns than overconfident CEOs, and the difference is economically large and 
statistically significant after 48 months. Specifically, the average cumulative abnormal return 
after 48 months following a repurchase announcement is approximately 10 percentage points 
larger if the announcement is made by a firm with an underconfident CEO than if made by a 
firm with an overconfident CEO. Note also that the number of total announcements given by 
overconfident CEOs is larger (1090) than the number of repurchases proposed by 
underconfident CEOs (821). These results suggest that while at the time of the announcement 
the stocks of the announcing firms tend to be undervalued on average, the stocks of firms with 
overconfident managers tend to be less so; overconfident CEOs seem to exaggerate the level of 
17 
 
underpricing of their firms’ stocks. The larger number of announcements by overconfident 
CEOs also confirms this conclusion.  
 
5.1 Announcing firms classified according to age and dividend payment status 
 
Table 4 studies the effect of overconfidence for firms classified according to age, and dividend 
payment status, all related to the difficulty of valuation. Panel A divides the announcing 
companies according to age. For old firms, the 48-month abnormal return for overconfident 
firms is not statistically different from zero, while for underconfident firms the 48-month return 
is 14.32 percent significant at the 5 percent level. The difference of over 18 percentage points 
is statistically significant. For young firms, the difference in abnormal returns between the two 
groups of managers is considerably larger, at approximately 26 percentage points. The 48-
month abnormal return for announcing firms with overconfident CEOs is 19.33 percent while 
for firms with underconfident CEOs the 48-month return is 45.25 percent both significant at the 
5 percent level. The difference between the two groups of managers is statistically significant 
at the 10% level.  
 
The abnormal returns classifying the announcing firms among dividend payers and non-
payers and the level of confidence of their CEOs are presented in Panel B. Announcing firms 
that do not pay dividends have higher abnormal returns than dividend-paying firms. Moreover, 
although for both groups underconfident CEOs achieve superior returns than overconfident 
CEOs, the difference is larger for firms that do not pay dividends. The 48-month return for non-
dividend-paying announcing firms is 36.82 percent when their CEOs are overconfident and 
54.58 percent when their CEOs are underconfident, while for dividend-paying firms the 48-
month abnormal returns are 10.35 percent and 18.83 percent for overconfident and 
underconfident CEOs respectively.  
 
We do not report the results when we classify the announcing firms into firms with 
positive earnings previous announcement and firms with zero or negative earnings because 
there are too few observations for firms with zero or negative earnings.  However,  the same 
pattern appears. The 48-month abnormal return for firms with underconfident managements is 
36.62 percent whereas when managers are overconfident the average abnormal cumulative 
return is 5.30 percent, although we cannot test the difference because of lack of observations. 
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The results of Table 4 show that when firms are more difficult to value, i.e., young firms 
and firms that do not distribute dividends, the stocks of firms with underconfident managers 
outperform the stocks of firms with overconfident managers, the difference being larger than 
for other firms. This is again consistent with the explanation of overconfident managers tending 
to overprice their stocks by a larger amount than underconfident managers, and the difference 
being larger when valuation is more difficult. 
 
5.2 Announcing firms classified by previous stock return performance and book-to-
market 
 
Panel A in Table 5 reports the results of sorting the announcing firms according to their 6-
month stock performance before the stock repurchase announcements. We find that when the 
previous stock performance is good, there is no statistically significant difference between 
announcements made by overconfident or underconfident managers. However, for poor 
previous performers, the abnormal returns for overconfident and underconfident managers are 
22.70 percent and 48.09 percent respectively, the difference being significant at the 1 percent 
level. Panel B classifies the announcing firms according to their book-to-market ratios. While 
we do not find a significant difference in the cumulative abnormal returns for low book-to-
market firms, we find a significant difference for firms with high book-to-market, being the 48-
month abnormal return for announcing firms with overconfident CEOs 5.67 percent, and with 
underconfident CEOs 28.04 percent. These results are consistent with Peyer and Vermalen 
(2009) argument that the long-term excess returns are a correction of an overreaction to bad 
news by the market previous announcement. Overconfident CEOs of firms that have seen their 
stock prices fall in the previous six months to the announcements or overconfident CEOs of 
firms with high book-to-market ratios are more likely to wrongly consider their stocks to be 
underpriced and therefore announce a repurchase when in fact the market is correct. 
Underconfident CEOs, however, are more objective in their judgments of the undervaluation, 
and only announce when in fact their stocks are truly underpriced. 
 
5.3 Announcing firms classified according to their financial constraints 
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Table 6 studies the effect of overconfidence on the abnormal returns after repurchase 
announcements for constrained and unconstrained firms using our four measures of financial 
constraints.  The table shows that regardless of the financial constraints measure used, stocks 
of both firms with overconfident and underconfident managers earn higher post-buyback 
abnormal returns for firms classified as being financially constrained. A potential explanation 
for this result is that due to the cost of spending cash when firms are constrained, managers 
announce buybacks when stocks are more underpriced.  
 
We further divide each group of constrained and unconstrained firms according to the 
level of confidence of the CEO of the announcing firm. For every measure of constraints used, 
we find that constrained firms with overconfident managers have significantly lower abnormal 
returns for long horizons (36 and 48 months) than firms with underconfident managers. The 
differences are statistically significant at the 48-month horizon when we use the Whited and 
Wu (2006) index and size as measures for financial constraints. In contrast, for unconstrained 
firms, there is not a statistically significant difference between the abnormal returns for 
overconfident and underconfident CEOs. These results are consistent with overconfident 
managers overpricing their own stocks. Financially constrained firms, where informational 
asymmetries are potentially large, might be more difficult to value for outsiders. Overconfident 
managers, who are aware of this fact, tend to disregard the information given by the market 
price and value their firm’s stock by their personal overconfident appraisals. This implies that 
a number of stock repurchases announced by overconfident CEOs are based on an 
overvaluation of their firms’ stocks and the average abnormal returns tend to be lower than for 
underconfident CEOs. Underconfident CEOs base their announcements on more objective 
valuations of their firms which also includes a careful consideration of the market price. 
Therefore, these underconfident managers tend to announce stock repurchases when their 
firms’ stocks are truly undervalued.  In the case of financially unconstrained companies, 
information asymmetries are smaller and our interpretation of the result is that overconfident 
managers regard the market’s valuations of their firms. This reduces the differences in abnormal 
returns between announcements by overconfident and underconfident CEOs since now both 
valuations tend to approach to the real value, which at the same time is closer to the market 
price, as indicated by the lower abnormal returns relative to financially constrained firms. 
 
 
5.4 Overconfidence and the intended buyback fraction  
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Table 7 shows the results of a cross-sectional regression where the dependent variable is the 
intended buyback fraction reported by the firms in the moment of the repurchase announcement. 
Intuitively, one would expect that when the CEO of a firm is overconfident, she will be less 
cautious about the fraction being repurchased since she is likely to price her firm’s stock higher 
than an underconfident CEO. The coefficient of the variable Confidence is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level and positive for every one of the six specifications. For 
example, using the estimated coefficient of Model 6, a firm with an overconfident CEO would 
announce a 1.269 percent larger buyback fraction than an underconfident CEO. This result is 
consistent with overconfident managers considering their stocks to be more underpriced and 
accordingly announcing larger fractions to be repurchased.   
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
Our benchmark measure for the degree of managers’ confidence is the press-based measure. As 
robustness tests, we employ two additional measures, namely the options-based measure of, for 
example, Malmendier and Tate (2008), and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), and the gender-
based measure of Barber and Odean (2001) and Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). 
 
5.4.1 Options-based measure for managerial overconfidence 
The results when using the options-based measure are presented in Table 8. Consistent with the 
results when employing the press-based measure in Table 3, Table 8 shows a large difference 
in the post-announcement abnormal returns between overconfident and underconfident 
managers when using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to estimate abnormal returns. 
Interestingly, different from Table 3, the difference in abnormal returns is statistically 
significant already at the 12-month horizon, where the abnormal returns of underconfident 
managers are more than twice larger than those of overconfident managers. The outperformance 
of stocks of underconfident managers rises with the horizon in terms of economic and statistical 
significance, and peaks at the 48-month. At that horizon, the abnormal returns of overconfident 
managers are 9.25% as opposed to 27.38% for underconfident firms, both statistically 
significant, and the difference between the two is highly statistically significant with a z-test 
value of 3.45. 
  
5.4.2 Gender-based measure for managerial overconfidence 
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Table 9 shows the results for the gender-based measure for managerial overconfidence. The 
results are largely consistent with the results in Tables 3 and 8. As seen in Panel A of Table 9, 
abnormal returns are on average lower when the executive teams comprise of only males. When 
the executive teams are mixed abnormal returns are higher for all horizons, although the 
differences in most of these cases are not statistically significant. The results in Panel B are 
similar. When both the CEOs and CFOs are males, abnormal returns are lower. Panel C presents 
very similar results when employing the gender of the CFO as a measure for the degree of 
confidence. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence consistent with Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) 
and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) that the buyback anomaly is being driven by mispricing. This 
hypothesis suggests that the managers of announcing firms perceive their stocks to be 
undervalued by the market and announce a stock repurchase in order to signal the misvaluation. 
If this is the case, then signals sent by an overconfident manager will be less credible to the 
market, and we would expect to see lower cumulative abnormal returns after the announcement. 
If the announcement is, however, made by an underconfident manager, then the market will be 
more likely to believe the signal since it will probably contain more objective information, and 
we should see higher abnormal returns. Using a press-based measure for managerial 
overconfidence, we provide evidence that while positive, the post-buyback announcements 
abnormal returns are substantially lower when CEOs are classified as overconfident.  
 
To further explore this finding, we divide the announcing firms according to various 
criteria that classify the firms by their difficulty to be valued and the likelihood of being 
underpriced. The underperformance of firms with overconfident CEOs is particularly strong for 
young, small, high book-to-market, and non-dividend paying firms all of which are difficult to 
value. Intuitively, when CEOs are overconfident they are likely to disregard the information 
given by the market price especially when valuation is difficult. However, when CEOs are 
underconfident, they are more cautious and carefully consider each piece of information 
available in their decision processes, including the market price. On the other hand, when firms 
are easier to value, overconfident CEOs know that the market price is based on a better quality 
of information, and are less likely to disregard the market price. In addition, we also find that 
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the difference in cumulative abnormal returns following repurchase announcements made by 
overconfident and underconfident CEOs is larger for those firms whose stocks have performed 
poorly in the 6 months previous to the announcement, and for those that have high book-to-
market ratios. This suggests that overconfident CEOs tend to overvalue their own shares when 
they have been performing poorly and that the market does not believe the signal. On the other 
hand, underconfident CEOs tend to announce when they are more certain about the 
undervaluation of their own stock and the market rectifies its price with time. Finally, 
consistently with overconfident managers overpricing the stock of their firms, we find that the 
intended buyback fraction at announcement is larger for overconfident CEOs than for 
underconfident CEOs.  
 
We challenge our results by using two other measures for overconfidence. We first use 
an options-based measure for managerial overconfidence. Namely, we use a longholder 
measure based on the CEOs’ option exercise behavior (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011). Then, we also divide the announcing firms according to the 
gender of the executive team, and the gender of the CEOs and CFOs, since males have been 
found to exhibit a more overconfident behavior than females  (Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Dahlbom et al., 2010). We find that the post-announcement 
CARs are significantly higher for underconfident managers regardless of the measure of 
overconfidence we use.  
 
 This paper, therefore, provides strong empirical evidence about the overreaction 
hypothesis driving the buyback anomaly. Moreover, we show that overconfident managers tend 
to overprice the stock of their firms and engage in repurchase activities that are not in the best 
benefit of the firm.  
 
We also find, differently from Chen and Wang (2012), that the post-buyback 
performance when the announcing firms are financially constrained is higher, not lower. This 
is to be expected if managers require larger underpricing due to the higher cost of capital. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Announcing Firms 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the sample of firms that announced stock repurchases from 1992 to 2009. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all the firms that 
announced a stock repurchase in the period 1992-2009. Panels B and C report descriptive statistics for announcing firms with overconfident and underconfident CEOs 
respectively. Overconfidence and underconfidence are determined following the Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) confidence indicator. Fraction sought is the initially 
announced repurchase ratio authorized by the board of directors. Prior 6-month return is the cumulative return of the company in the previous 6 months to the repurchase 
announcement. WW is the Whited and Wu (2006) index of financial constraints. Size is the market value of common equity. SA is the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of 
financial constraints.  KZ is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index of financial constraints. BM is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity. Actual 
Repurchases is the total number of announcements that were actually repurchased. Actual to Announced is given by the ratio of Actual Repurchases to Total Announcements. 
WW, Size, SA, KZ, and BM have been winsorized at the 1% level.  
Panel A: Total Announcements 
Calendar  Number of Fraction  Prior 6-month Average Average Average Average Average  Actual  Actual 
year Events Sought Returns WW Size SA KZ BM Repurchases to Announced 
1992  594 8.35 -2.40% -0.27 1,555.98 -1,117.65 0.32 0.65 157 26.43% 
1993    598 7.82 4.33% -0.29 1,761.81 -1,159.99 0.22 0.62 181 30.27% 
1994     1,000 7.45 -2.93% -0.28 1,569.00 -1,191.43 0.30 0.72 249 24.90% 
1995      1,087 7.16 4.85% -0.29 2,093.87 -1,154.13 0.37 0.66 291 26.77% 
1996       1,398 7.36 -0.08% -0.30 2,599.25 -1,046.32 0.43 0.62 309 22.10% 
1997 1,210 8.34 7.93% -0.29 3,051.34 -1,011.91 0.56 0.50 209 17.27% 
1998 1,855 8.32 -10.36% -0.29 2,079.45    -866.58 0.63 0.67 228 12.29% 
1999 1,474 8.60 -2.92% -0.28 1,680.23 -1,037.18 0.67 0.84 177 12.01% 
2000     795 9.01 -7.59% -0.31 3,611.51 -1,231.15 0.61 0.88 198 24.91% 
2001     640 8.57 -1.80% -0.28 3,754.87 -1,116.99 0.63 0.66 90 14.06% 
2002     476 10.38 -4.24% -0.29 3,676.31 -1,162.84 0.48 0.73 69 14.50% 
2003    490 9.63 12.16% -0.31 4,031.08 -1,232.42 0.58 0.48 68 13.88% 
2004    584 8.57 5.74% -0.35 5,508.73 -1,342.44 0.48 0.43 81 13.87% 
2005    652 8.89 4.18% -0.36 5,721.51 -1,557.10 0.57 0.49 68 10.43% 
2006    624 8.79 1.75% -0.35 6,700.86 -1,504.04 0.47 0.46 53 8.49% 
2007      985 9.02 -1.87% -0.36 5,612.21 -1,483.76 0.48 0.61 89 9.04% 
2008   1,110 9.70 -16.86% -0.32 2,526.03 -1,150.12 0.30 1.03 78 7.03% 
2009      453 10.16 -1.03% -0.33 3,715.59 -1,209.59 0.39 0.71 33 7.28% 
 All      16,025 8.35 -1.68% -0.31 3,090.87 -1,153.78 0.48 0.67 2,628 16.40% 
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Panel B: Announcements by Overconfident CEOs 
Calendar  Number of Fraction  Prior 6-month 
      
Average Average Average Average Average  Actual   Actual 
year Events Sought Returns  WW            Size SA KZ BM Repurchases to Announced 
1992 23 6.17 3.60% -0.41            11,622  -2,556 -0.35 0.37 8 34.78% 
1993 34 5.00 0.85% -0.44              8,629  -2,627 -0.14 0.43 9 26.47% 
1994 54 6.25 -0.73% -0.44            10,106  -2,558 0.12 0.52 16 29.63% 
1995 60 6.15 7.74% -0.42            13,533  -2,775 0.29 0.44 24 40.00% 
1996 77 6.75 4.84% -0.46            17,052  -2,778 0.49 0.44 17 22.08% 
1997 81 6.85 13.70% -0.45            17,423  -2,725 0.44 0.36 11 13.58% 
1998 95 9.52 -1.19% -0.43            14,469  -2,380 0.64 0.39 14 14.74% 
1999 75 7.02 2.44% -0.40            11,589  -2,338 0.99 0.40 9 12.00% 
2000 99 7.83 -8.45% -0.43            16,470  -2,628 0.67 0.52 22 22.22% 
2001 56 7.93 -6.10% -0.41            17,449  -2,370 0.75 0.43 7 12.50% 
2002 47 8.71 -14.87% -0.43            19,095  -2,641 0.52 0.45 9 19.15% 
2003 45 9.35 10.75% -0.43            21,727  -2,666 0.47 0.34 6 13.33% 
2004 72 14.72 3.99% -0.45            21,058  -2,452 0.44 0.36 6 8.33% 
2005 82 9.67 4.77% -0.46            18,493  -2,617 0.57 0.40 5 6.10% 
2006 91 9.32 1.59% -0.46            21,617  -2,719 0.36 0.35 7 7.69% 
2007 96 8.98 4.74% -0.47            22,001  -2,673 0.59 0.47 8 8.33% 
2008 74 14.52 -9.66% -0.44            11,330  -2,682 0.40 0.67 0 0.00% 
2009 33 11.57 21.79% -0.44            15,093  -2,407 0.36 0.42 0 0.00% 
 All 1,194 8.11 1.86% -0.44            16,556  -2,595 0.49 0.43 178 14.91% 
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Panel C: Announcements by Underconfident CEOs 
Calendar  Number of Fraction  Prior 6-month Average Average Average Average Average  Actual   Actual 
year Events Sought  Returns WW Size SA KZ BM Repurchases to Announced 
1992 13 3.31 11.58% -0.45              9,554  -2,784  0.36 0.41 5 38.46% 
1993 40 4.58 11.43% -0.40              7,079  -2,081  0.12 0.40 10 25.00% 
1994 66 5.52 3.09% -0.39              5,514  -2,137  -0.07 0.47 14 21.21% 
1995 66 5.46 8.29% -0.38              7,392  -2,096  0.32 0.43 18 27.27% 
1996 75 6.84 6.35% -0.42            10,927  -2,263  0.23 0.34 13 17.33% 
1997 88 7.57 17.62% -0.40              9,995  -2,067  0.36 0.30 15 17.05% 
1998 99 7.00 -1.93% -0.39              7,540  -1,936  0.65 0.35 11 11.11% 
1999 70 7.15 7.52% -0.37              7,757  -1,845  0.57 0.44 5 7.14% 
2000 53 8.57 -1.14% -0.41            12,467  -2,083  0.46 0.44 12 22.64% 
2001 34 10.32 -6.54% -0.43            14,872  -2,333  0.67 0.37 5 14.71% 
2002 21 6.41 1.77% -0.41            11,907  -2,294  0.24 0.44 2 9.52% 
2003 19 6.50 21.21% -0.41            10,419  -2,213  0.66 0.38 0 0.00% 
2004 33 7.83 8.02% -0.44            12,716  -2,491  0.21 0.38 6 18.18% 
2005 45 14.39 4.18% -0.44            11,195  -2,527  0.52 0.43 3 6.67% 
2006 37 5.87 0.23% -0.44            14,108  -2,443  0.28 0.45 4 10.81% 
2007 72 10.64 1.50% -0.45            14,544  -2,488  0.32 0.49 3 4.17% 
2008 48 12.53 -11.18% -0.46            13,828  -2,613  0.31 0.71 4 8.33% 
2009 20 9.12 6.57% -0.48            21,682  -2,782  0.08 0.42 1 5.00% 
 All  899 7.12 4.63% -0.41            10,440  -2,220  0.37 0.42 131 14.57% 
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Table 2.Descriptive statistics for non-announcing firms 
This table reports descriptive statistics of firms that did not announce a stock repurchase from 1992 to 2009.  
WW is the Whited and Wu (2006) index of financial constraints. Size is the market value of common equity. 
SA is the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index of financial constraints.  KZ index is the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index of financial constraints. BM is the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity.  WW, 
Size, SA, KZ, and BM have been winsorized at the 1% level.  
Calendar Number of Average Average  Average Average  Average  
year firms WW  size       SA  KZ BM 
1992 1,071 -0.17             296  -749  1.08 0.48 
1993 1,352 -0.20             304  -529  1.05 0.48 
1994 1,235 -0.19             351  -448  0.90 0.56 
1995 1,089 -0.19             537  -405  1.07 0.44 
1996 1,454 -0.21             546  -349  0.86 0.43 
1997 1,215 -0.23             857  -467  1.15 0.41 
1998 952 -0.23             930  -602  1.14 0.60 
1999 1,231 -0.21          2,335  -563  1.30 0.43 
2000 1,100 -0.22          2,017  -559  0.91 0.76 
2001 514 -0.26          3,218  -977  0.88 0.69 
2002 490 -0.26          2,086  -1,063  0.85 0.70 
2003 445 -0.29          2,356  -1,224  0.40 0.46 
2004 576 -0.27          2,024  -862  0.62 0.42 
2005 572 -0.29          1,821  - 891  0.72 0.42 
2006 557 -0.33          2,798  -852  0.50 0.41 
2007 580 -0.28          1,423  -777  0.58 0.50 
2008 269 -0.28          1,200  -712  0.54 1.13 
2009 258 -0.26          1,513  -698  0.73 0.66 
 All years  14,960 -0.23          1,259  -624  0.95 0.52 
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Table 3. Long-run abnormal return after open repurchase announcements divided by  CEO 
confidence  
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across 
time and security (IRATS) method combined with the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model with the addition 
of momentum, for the firms that announced and open repurchase.  First, the regression is done for the full 
sample, with the only condition that another announcement had not taken place in the previous month. Then, 
the sample is divided into 2 groups according to whether their CEOs are classified as overconfident or 
underconfident following the Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) overconfidence indicator. Difference z-test is 
the one-tailed z-test for the difference between the overconfidence estimates and the underconfidence 
estimates. The sample period is 1992 to 2009.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. For the difference z-test, * indicates significance in a two-tail test, and + significance in a one-tail 
test. 
 Full sample  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic z-test 
Panel A: 4 Factors 
(+1.+12)  5.69% 13.27***  5.77% 4.85***  6.26% 4.96*** -0.28 
(+1,+24)  12.69% 19.83***  13.17% 7.49***  13.50% 6.88*** -0.12 
(+1,+36)  19.46% 23.39***  16.48% 7.49***  21.67% 8.44*** -1.54+ 
(+1,+48)  25.12% 24.92***  17.39% 6.55***  27.80% 8.88*** -2.53**+++ 
Obs 14,027  1,090  821  
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Table 4. Long-run abnormal returns  by age, dividend payment status,  and CEO confidence  
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across time and security (IRATS) method combined with the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, with momentum as an additional factor, for the firms that announced and open repurchase. In Panel A, firms are divided into 
two groups depending on their age, measured by the number of months the firms had appeared at CRSP previous the repurchase announcement. 242 months is the 
90 percentile conditional on having confidence information. 71 months is the 10 percentile conditional on having confidence information. Then, each subsample is 
divided into 2 groups according to whether the CEOs are classified as overconfident or underconfident following the Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) overconfidence 
indicator. Panel B divides firms into two groups depending on whether they paid dividends in the previous year to the repurchase announcement or not. Each subgroup 
is further divided by CEO confidence. Difference z-test is the one-tailed z-test for the difference between overconfident CEO and underconfident CEO estimates.   The 
sample period is 1992 to 2009. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. For the difference z-test, * indicates significance in a two-tail 
test, and + significance in a one-tail test. 
Panel A: Long-run abnormal returns  by age and CEO confidence  
 Old Firms≥242 months  Young Firms ≤ 71 months 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months    CAR      t-statistic      CAR   t-statistic      z-test          CAR   t-statistic       CAR   t-statistic       z-test   
  (+1.+12)  0.69% 0.31  0.91% 0.38    -0.06  8.72% 1.96**  13.34% 2.92*** -0.73 
  (+1,+24)  2.90% 0.94  4.30% 1.11    -0.28  20.12% 3.07***  28.42% 3.95*** -0.85 
  (+1,+36)  -0.92% -0.25  8.53%   1.60*    -1.45+  22.34% 2.71***  38.44% 3.83*** -1.24 
  (+1,+48)  -4.12% -0.94  14.32%     2.11**  -0.28**++  19.33% 2.03**  45.25% 3.82*** -1.70*++ 
Obs 326  175   92  98  
Panel B: Long-run abnormal returns  by dividends and  CEO confidence 
 Dividends  No dividends 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months    CAR       t-statistic      CAR   t-statistic      z-test     CAR   t-statistic       CAR   t-statistic   z-test   
  (+1.+12)  2.37% 2.00**  2.68% 2.11**  -0.74  15.63% 4.99***  15.23% 4.50***  0.08  
  (+1,+24)  7.89% 4.37***  9.04% 4.60***  -0.43  28.64% 6.51***  25.56% 4.80***  0.45  
  (+1,+36)  8.69% 3.78***  15.24% 5.90*** -1.89*++  37.09% 6.96***  40.30% 5.80***  -0.37  
  (+1,+48)  10.35% 3.64***  18.83% 5.84*** -1.97**++  36.82% 5.90***  54.58% 6.69***  -1.73*++  
Obs 788   613     278   186   
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Table 5. Long-run abnormal return  by past performance, book-to-market, and CEO confidence 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across time and security (IRATS) method combined with the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model with momentum as an additional factor, for the firms that announced and open repurchase. Panel A divides firms into two groups depending 
on the previous 6-month performance of their stock.  A firm is classified as a good previous performer if its cumulative return for the 6 months before an announcement is above 
the 75 percentile of all the firms that announced a stock repurchase. A firm is classified as a bad performer if its cumulative return for the previous 6 months to an announcement 
is below the 25 percentile of all the firms that announced a repurchase. Panel B divides firms into two groups depending on the  BM-ratio in the year before the announcement.  
A firm is classified as having a high BM-ratio if, in the year before the announcement, it is above the 75 percentile of all the firms that announced repurchases. A firm is classified 
as a low BM if, in the previous year to an announcement, its BM is below the 25 percentile of all the firms that announced repurchases. BM is defined as the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market 
value of common equity. The variable was winsorized at the 1% level in each tail.   Then, each subsample is divided into 2 groups according to whether the CEOs are classified as 
overconfident or underconfident following the Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) overconfidence indicator. Difference z-test is the one-tailed z-test for the difference between 
the overconfident CEO and underconfident CEO estimates. The sample period is 1992 to 2009.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. For the 
difference z-test, * indicates significance in a two-tail test, and + significance in a one-tail test. 
Panel A: Long-run abnormal return  by previous six-month performance and confidence 
 Poor Previous 6-month  Performers  Good Previous 6-month  Performers 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO    Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months   CAR     t-statistic      CAR    t-statistic         z-test       CAR     t-statistic      CAR     t-statistic      z-test   
  (+1.+12)    9.12% 2.88***    9.06% 2.86*** 0.01    6.64% 2.51***    7.65% 2.85*** -0.27 
  (+1,+24)  21.74% 4.81***  23.19% 4.49***         -0.21  11.83% 3.00***  13.68% 3.42*** -0.33 
  (+1,+36)  27.99% 5.27***  37.26% 5.58***         -1.09  13.86% 2.86***  19.11% 3.75*** -0.75 
  (+1,+48)  22.70% 3.70***  48.09% 6.20***    -2.57**+++    20.63% 6.61***  23.32% 3.74*** -0.32 
Obs 282  180   240  215  
Panel B: Long-run abnormal return by BM and CEO confidence 
 High BM  Low BM 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO     Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months CAR   t-statistic    CAR   t-statistic         z-test     CAR   t-statistic    CAR     t-statistic      z-test   
  (+1.+12)   2.40%       0.83    4.73% -0.62         -0.62  10.64% 4.60***  11.31%  3.98*** -0.18 
  (+1,+24)   8.77% 2.08**  15.53% -1.16         -1.15  18.97% 5.91***  17.97%  4.27*** 0.19 
  (+1,+36)  10.21% 1.97**  24.82% -1.98**    -1.98**++  26.14% 6.48***  26.60%  5.02*** -0.07 
  (+1,+48)    5.67%       0.90  28.04% -2.50**     -2.50**+++    28.50% 6.12***  31.05%  4.79*** -0.32 
Obs 256   202     283   186   
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Table 6. Long-run abnormal return  by financial constraints, and CEO confidence 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across time and security (IRATS) method combined with the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model with momentum as an additional factor, for the firms that announced and open repurchase. Firms are divided into financially 
constrained and financially unconstrained. A firm is classified as constrained if it belonged to the top 25 percentile of the Whited and Wu (2006) index (Panel A), to 
the  lowest 25 percentile according to size (Panel B), to the top 25 percentile of the size and age Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index (Panel C), or top 25 percentile in the  
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (Panel D)  in the previous year to the  announcement, and as unconstrained if it belonged to any other  percentile for the Whited 
and Wu, the size and age Hadlock and Pierce, and the Kaplan and Zingales indexes, or if the firm belonged to the top 25 percentile in size.  The indexes have been 
winsorized at the 1% level of their distributions to avoid the effects of extreme values. Size is defined as the market value of common equity in the previous year to 
the announcement. Then, each subsample is divided into 2 groups according to whether the CEOs are classified as overconfident or underconfident following the 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) overconfidence indicator.  Difference z-test is the one-tailed z-test for the difference between the overconfident CEO and 
underconfident CEO estimates. The sample period is 1992 to 2009. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. For the difference z-test, 
* indicates significance in a two-tail test, and + significance in a one-tail test. 
 Financially Constrained  Financially Unconstrained 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months CAR   t-statistic     CAR   t-statistic          z-test       CAR   t-statistic        CAR   t-statistic          z-test   
Panel A: 4 Financial constraints measured by WW index 
  (+1.+12)  14.95% 4.23***  13.00% 4.11***  0.41  4.21% 3.28***  3.34% 2.27*** 0.45 
  (+1,+24)  26.82% 5.40***  22.82% 4.79***  0.58  9.63% 4.98***  9.28% 3.98*** 0.12 
  (+1,+36)  29.85% 4.83***  38.75% 6.23*** -1.01  12.92% 5.31***  14.40% 4.69*** -0.38 
  (+1,+48)  32.09% 4.35***  54.11% 7.51***         -2.14**++  14.05% 4.74***  17.70% 4.50*** -0.74 
Obs 199  213   783  465  
Panel B: 4 Financial constraints measured by Size 
  (+1.+12)  13.35% 3.52***  7.72% 2.88*** 1.21  3.12% 1.61*  6.53% 2.59*** -1.07 
  (+1,+24)  27.71% 5.29***  17.59% 4.29***   1.52+  6.64% 2.31**  10.44% 2.76*** -0.8 
  (+1,+36)  26.01% 4.02***  30.40% 5.67***          -0.52  8.76% 2.48***  14.29% 2.98*** -0.93 
  (+1,+48)  23.41% 3.08***  43.37% 6.83***        -2.01**++  9.80% 2.36***  16.14% 2.70*** -0.87 
Obs 199  263   328  143  
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 Financially Constrained  Financially Unconstrained 
 Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference  Overconfident CEO  Underconfident CEO Difference 
Months CAR   t-statistic     CAR   t-statistic           z-test       CAR   t-statistic        CAR   t-statistic         z-test   
Panel C: Financial constraints measured by SA index 
  (+1.+12)  15.08% 4.50***  9.94% 3.75***          1.2  4.47% 3.49***  3.83% 2.86***  0.34 
  (+1,+24)  27.39% 5.67***  19.07% 4.79*** 1.33+  10.40% 5.53***  9.58% 4.45***  0.29 
  (+1,+36)  29.65% 4.89***  32.14% 6.17***         -0.31  13.75% 5.86***  14.99% 5.36*** -0.34 
  (+1,+48)  32.09% 4.40***  45.10% 7.34***         -1.37+  14.46% 5.08***  17.39% 4.96*** -0.65 
Obs 193  273   874  528  
Panel D: 4 Financial constraints measured by KZ index 
 (+1.+12)  9.68% 3.19***  4.56%    1.27          1.09  5.58% 4.19***  6.48% 4.29*** -0.45 
  (+1,+24)  15.98% 3.81***  19.73% 3.55***         -0.54  12.89% 6.27***  11.72% 5.02***  0.38 
  (+1,+36)  21.20% 3.98***  27.97% 4.12***         -0.78  16.60% 6.46***  19.63% 6.15*** -0.74 
  (+1,+48)  17.69% 2.71***  32.97% 4.15***         -1.49+  19.22% 6.21***  26.67% 6.71***  -1.48+ 
Obs 258   151     699   522  
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Table 7. Cross-sectional regression analyses of the intended buyback fraction 
This table examines whether firms with overconfident  CEOs announce a higher intended buyback fraction than 
firms with underconfident CEOs. The variable Confidence takes the value of 1 if a CEO is classified as 
overconfident, and 0 if a CEO is classified as underconfident following the Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) 
overconfidence indicator. Size is defined as the market value of common equity. BM is defined as the ratio of 
the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Prior return is the 6-month cumulative return for the 6 
months preceding the announcement. Profitability is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
plus depreciation and amortization to shareholders equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes. Div/BE is the ratio 
of total dividends to booked equity defined as the shareholders’ equity plus balance sheet deferred taxes. All 
the independent variables with the exception of Confidence, have been lagged one period. Size, BM, Profitability 
and Div/BE have been winsorized at the 1% level.  The sample period is 1992 to 2009. The estimation method is 
pooled OLS with standard errors clustered at the firm level.  The t-statistics are reported in brackets under each 
coefficient.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
                Model 1      Model 2      Model 3      Model 4      Model 5      Model 6  
Intercept   6.917 7.166 6.563 6.435      6.212 6.289 
            (18.88***)  (18.41***)  (13.32***)  (12.93***)  (12.24***)   (11.72***) 
Confidence  1.138 1.377 1.327 1.448 1.295 1.269 
            (1.95*)   (2.21**)   (2.11**)   (2.22**) (1.76*) (1.73*) 
Size   -0.000035 -0.000026 -0.000026 -0.000018 -0.000016 
              (-1.48) (-1.12) (-1.09) (-0.56) (-0.48) 
BM     1.325  1.377 1.515 1.381 
              (1.37)      (1.40) (1.43) (1.31) 
Prior Return     0.232 -0.088 -0.081 
                    (0.22)     (-0.07) (-0.07) 
Profitability       0.592 0.751 
                     (0.90) (1.07) 
Div/BE       -1.787 
                      (-0.32) 
         N  923 912 912 885 705 704 
        R2  0.0044 0.0069 0.0525 0.0097 0.0084 0.008 
Adjusted R2  0.0033 0.0047 0.0053 0.0052 0.0013 0.0005 
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Table 8. Long-run abnormal returns divided by  CEO confidence as measured by the Malmendier 
and Tate (2005) confidence indicator 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns 
across time and security (IRATS) method combined with the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model with the 
addition of momentum, for the firms that announced and open repurchase.  First, the regression is done for 
the full sample, with the only condition that another announcement had not taken place in the previous 
month. Then, the sample is divided into 2 groups according to whether their CEOs are classified as 
overconfident or underconfident following the Malmendier and Tate (2005) overconfidence measure. 
Difference z-test is the one-tailed z-test for the difference between the overconfident CEO and the 
underconfident CEO estimates. The sample period is 1992 to 2009.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. For the difference z-test, * indicates significance in a two-tail test, and + 
significance in a one-tail test. 
 Full sample  
Overconfident 
CEO  
Underconfident 
CEO Difference 
Months CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic z-test 
(+1.+12)  5.69% 13.27***  3.54% 1.96**  7.98% 7.85*** -2.15**++ 
(+1,+24)  12.69% 19.83***  6.60% 2.30**  15.36% 10.96*** -2.74***+++ 
(+1,+36)  19.46% 23.39***  7.27% 1.91*  21.17% 11.84*** -3.31***+++ 
(+1,+48)  25.12% 24.92***  9.25% 1.94*  27.38% 12.48*** -3.45***+++ 
Obs 14,027  619  1,903  
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Table 9. Long-run abnormal return after open repurchase announcements divided by  gender 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) in percent using Ibbotson's (1975) returns across 
time and security (IRATS) method combined with the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model with the addition of 
momentum,  for the firms that announced and open repurchase. Panel A divides the announcing firms into 2 groups 
according to whether all the executives were males (All Males) or there were females on the executive team. Panel 
B divides the announcing firms into 2 groups according to whether both, the CEO and the CFO are males  (Male CEO 
and CFO) or at least one of them is a female (No male CEO or CFO). Panel C divides the announcing firms into 2 
groups according to whether the CFO is a male or a female. Difference z-test is the one-tailed z-test for the 
difference between the high confidence estimates and the low confidence estimates. The sample period is 1992 to 
2009.  ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. For the difference z-test, * indicates 
significance in a two-tail test, and + significance in a one-tail test. 
Panel A: By Gender of the Executive Team 
 All Males  Mixed Board Difference 
Months CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic z-test 
  (+1.+12)  5.52% 8.94***  6.07% 4.75*** -0.39 
  (+1,+24)  11.90% 12.91***  12.37% 6.96*** -0.24 
  (+1,+36)  16.75% 13.98***  18.85% 8.27*** -0.82 
  (+1,+48)  20.74% 14.12***  24.96% 9.08*** -1.35+ 
Obs 4,250  1,533  
Panel B: By Gender of CEO and CFO 
 Male CEO and CFO  No Male CEO or CFO Difference 
Months CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic z-test 
  (+1.+12)  5.05% 7.71***  11.27% 3.33*** -1.80*++ 
  (+1,+24)  11.27% 11.48***  18.93% 4.36*** -1.72*++ 
  (+1,+36)  16.77% 12.97***  21.37% 4.11*** -0.86 
  (+1,+48)  21.37% 13.30***  25.68% 4.21*** -0.68 
Obs 4,084  397  
Panel C: By Gender of CFO 
 Male CFO  Female CFO Difference 
Months CAR t-statistic   CAR t-statistic z-test 
  (+1.+12)  5.03% 7.68***  12.75% 3.25***          -1.94*++ 
  (+1,+24)  11.14% 11.37***  21.51% 4.42*** -2.09**++ 
  (+1,+36)  16.72% 12.97***  22.11% 3.84***           -0.91 
  (+1,+48)  21.31% 13.33***  26.45% 3.91***           -0.74 
Obs 4,164  317  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
